# Aff Answers

### 2AC – PDB

#### Perm do both – coordination key to access high-demand experts – the counterplan alone fails to solve deterrence

Kreuttner et al. 18 (Col. Tim Kreuttner, U.S. Army; Lt. Col. Sami Alnaqbi, United Arab Emirates Navy; Lt. Col. Jarrod Knapp, U.S. Air Force; Maj. James Woodard, U.S. Marine Corps“A Joint and Operational Approach for Security Assistance to Georgia and Ukraine,” Military Review, March-April 2018, WC)

The U.S. and NATO’s ability to deliver training, education, and advice at the operational level will face challenges. Synchronization of operational maneuver and the ability to integrate joint capabilities in a coherent campaign is something that even the best militaries have to work hard at to do well. The requisite expertise to train partners in operational planning and execution is not plentiful and usually resides in combatant command or other major command staffs, with the majority not dedicated to training, exercises, or other security cooperation activities.

Subject-matter experts capable of leading training are low-density, high-demand assets whose own organizations are often reluctant to part with for “secondary” security cooperation tasks—namely planners, strategists, joint-fires-qualified experts, and other joint doctrine and technical experts. The United States needs to manage the joint and operational expertise closely to leverage the right expertise at the right time while not levying an undue burden on owning organizations. But, for partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia to progress, this is necessary.

Conclusion

Ukraine and Georgia are on the front lines of strategic competition. While the United States and NATO have provided robust tactical training and strategic development over the last twenty years, there is a gap in joint training and development at the operational level. The U.S. and NATO security assistance to these geopolitically key nations contributes to deterrence of Russia while improving the interoperability and capability of important partners. An integrated joint approach to security cooperation focusing at the operational level will strengthen Ukraine and Georgia and serve as an appropriate deterrent to Russian aggression. A joint approach to partnership programs would significantly enhance the defense capability and interoperability of Ukraine and Georgia to participate in NATO operations and exercises. Expanding combined, joint interoperability at the operational level should be the next critical focus of our partnerships.

### 2AC – PDCP

#### Perm do the counterplan – normal means security cooperation includes the state department

Anderson et al. 16 (R. Reed Anderson, Patrick J. Ellis, Antonio M. Paz, Kyle A. Reed, Lendy “Alamo” Renegar and John T. Vaughan *“STRATEGIC LANDPOWER AND A RESURGENT RUSSIA: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO DETERRENCE*: Chapter 4 THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, May 1, 2016, pp. 117-142, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12082.11>, WC)

\*\*\*Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security\*\*\*

Although the United States TSC efforts are facilitating many of the military-focused assurance and deterrence tasks NATO has recently undertaken, there is room for improvement in gaining U.S. interagency support for conducting FID training. The goal for this type of FID would be to assist with strengthening the resilience of a NATO ally to ensure they are less vulnerable to Russian ambiguous actions. The challenge for conducting what might be thought of as “interagency FID” would be establishing priority countries, identifying focus areas, and getting the appropriate trainers in place. The key in every case is for the United States and allied or partner countries to jointly determine the lines of effort necessary to achieve specific and attainable objectives while considering NATO defense planning process priorities. The United States must be cognizant of the strategic end states for each Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and associated country specific **Security Cooperation** Sections, which should lay out the end states and the ways to achieve them, and should be coordinated with the U.S. Embassy Integrated Country Strategy and associated foreign assistance plans.

There are several challenges to employing an interagency FID effort to build resilience among NATO allies. First, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and EUCOM must ensure that the DoS Regional Strategies and EUCOM’s TCP are mutually supporting. There is no clear chain of command in this process, and it will certainly involve intense personal engagement from leaders across the interagency. The primary stakeholders, DoS and EUCOM, operate differently with respect to generating strategy. The presidentially appointed ambassadors are the lead for developing their country plans, which are then forwarded to the DoS in Washington for inclusion in the regional strategies. In the DoD, the policy offices of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) and EUCOM generate the strategy and then push it down to subordinate elements for execution. The common ground for decision-makers can be hard to determine since the Ambassador is the lead for DoS and is country focused and the EUCOM commander is the lead for DoD and is regionally focused. Achieving unity of effort toward building resilient partners will require a constant, integrated engagement from both bureaucracies. Additionally, it would be invaluable to generate some form of interagency resilience strategy that would synchronize efforts.23

### 2AC – CP links to NB

#### Perm shields the link and the CP links to DoD DA – their budgets are synchronized and DoD is essential to security assistance

Doubleday 17 (Justin Doubleday, managing editor of Inside the Pentagon until June 2021, where he focused on defense-wide topics including budgets, acquisition policy, combatant commands, missile defense and cyber, “DOD, State Department establish security assistance steering committee,” Inside the Pentagon , September 28, 2017, Vol. 33, No. 39, pp. 1, 10-11, WC)

The Pentagon and the State Department have set up a high-level group to help synchronize the two agencies’ control over billions of dollars’ worth of security assistance to foreign countries.

The Security Sector Assistance Steering Group was established this past spring by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, according to Todd Harvey, acting assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities. Harvey testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Sept. 26.

The steering committee will help “oversee a collaborative planning process, identifying top national security priorities and synchronizing investments to maximize results,” according to Harvey’s written testimony.

One of the committee’s immediate priorities is to develop a process for fiscal year 2018 security sector assistance planning to “permit State and DOD to validate security assistance requirements for countries that directly support this administration’s top priorities,” according to Tina Kaidanow, acting assistant secretary of state for the bureau of political military affairs. Kaidanow and Harvey are co-chairs of the new steering committee.

The committee will also ensure DOD’s expanding security assistance programs match up with the State Department’s traditional lead role for that function, according to Kaidanow’s testimony. The State Department requested $5.1 billion for Foreign Military Financing in FY-18, with $3.1 billion earmarked for Israel and $1.3 billion planned for Egypt.

But Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Ben Cardin (D-MD) expressed concern over the growing security assistance role played by the Pentagon. DOD oversees several security assistance programs, including the $1.5 billion Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria fund and the $4.2 billion Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.

Cardin called such programs “necessary and important,” but worried about the control over security assistance shifting from the State Department to the Pentagon.

“My chief concern, however, is that DOD is setting up an essentially parallel security assistance structure without sufficient State Department oversight, input and coordination,” Cardin said. “Combine this with the current administration’s profoundly unwise proposal to slash the Department of State’s budget, opaque reorganization efforts and increasing loss of experienced personnel, and one could easily see us in a scenario in which the Department of Defense could become the dominant source of U.S. security assistance.”

Cardin pointed to section 333 of Title 10, which mandates the secretary of state concur with any train-and-equip program proposed by the Pentagon.

The new steering committee will “optimize section 333 military assistance and [Foreign Military Financing] resources to effectively advance national security objectives, leverage each Department’s expertise and authorities, and reinforce our respective requests to Congress,” according to Kaidanow’s testimony.

“In the longer term, the intent is to strategically integrate State and DOD planning and resourcing processes for a wider range of SSA resources, including by synchronizing budget requests and rationalizing and refining the use of SSA authorities,” her testimony added. -- Justin Doubleday

### 2AC - DoD key - AI

#### DoD action better than DoS – leaders have already allocated leadership to them

Horowitz and Kahn 22 (Michael C. Horowitz and Lauren Kahn – Professor on American foreign policy at John Hopkins – “Why DoD’s New Approach to Data and Artificial Intelligence Should Enhance National Defense” – March 11, 2022 – <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-dods-new-approach-data-and-artificial-intelligence-should-enhance-national-defense//daxw>)

The ability of the United States to compete in the 21st century depends on U.S. leadership in data and artificial intelligence (AI). In response, **the Department of Defense (DoD) is taking a new and much-needed approach to U.S. defense efforts in data and AI**. David Spirk, the departing Chief Data Officer of the Pentagon, made clear yesterday that the office of the Chief Digital and AI Officer (CDAO), in addition to its other functions, will be the successor organization for and replace DoD’s much-touted Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). While the JAIC symbolized DoD’s efforts to get smart on AI beginning in 2018, the integration of data and AI represents a maturation of the U.S. AI approach—one that elevates the importance of AI in national defense. The JAIC itself was not as important as what the JAIC stood for—**DoD’s commitment to U.S. defense AI leadership**. In paving the way forward and getting AI on the agenda, the JAIC succeeded. From this point on, a more cohesive approach to AI and data through the CDAO is more likely to accelerate AI adoption throughout the U.S. military because it links DoD’s AI efforts with data, the fuel AI requires. For U.S. defense AI adoption, in particular, aligning these organizations could be game-changing. Addressing DoD’s siloed data, standardizing and improving its quality and access, is a precondition to having the data necessary to train algorithms for many defense uses, and any future technologies that rely on collecting, processing, and using information. Implementation will be critical and heavily dependent on two things. First, to catalyze AI adoption, the CDAO will need to develop close relationships with the military services and combatant commands. Second, the CDAO will need to coordinate with DoD’s research and development organizations, such as the Defense Innovation Unit, leading on AI experimentation and research. There is hard work ahead, but the new organizational design is promising. The office of the CDAO brings together previously independent components of DoD: the JAIC, the office of the Chief Data Officer, the Defense Digital Service (DDS), and the Office of Advancing Analytics (ADVANA). The office of the Chief Data Officer is in charge of data management and coordination, DDS finds digital solutions for internal data and security issues, and ADVANA aggregates data and conducts data analytics. The combination of these offices raised questions about whether an independent JAIC was necessary for U.S. defense AI leadership. Departing CDO Spirk says that the CDAO will be “taking the best parts of all the organizations it is overseeing and redistributing them for faster and better decision-making.” We agree. At present, not only is DoD’s data siloed but its AI efforts and initiatives are as well. According to the company Govini, in FY21, fifteen separate departments and organizations funded and worked on AI and AI-adjacent technologies, often without formal coordination or throughlines. This has led to redundancies, gaps, inconsistencies in application and access to data and resources, and an overall hodge-podge of AI efforts. DoD has acknowledged this and is making organizational changes necessary to accelerate AI adoption even more by restructuring its AI approach from the ground up. Now, CDAO will have teams working on policy and governance, technology development, and rolling out data and AI for the Pentagon and the military services, to avoid bureaucratic duplication and confusion that could undermine the CDAO’s overall authority. In particular, bringing the data and AI teams together will improve the data DoD needs for AI development. Some might fear that the reorganization of the JAIC’s functions within the CDAO means the United States is not as committed to the role of AI in the future of U.S. national defense. Based on current information, this concern is misplaced. First, the JAIC was created so the U.S. military could effectively take advantage of the way AI will shape the future of war. It succeeded in many ways. Recognition of the importance of AI for the future of U.S. defense, and national security in general, is much more widespread. The JAIC made headway on AI adoption and data literacy, with initiatives like “AI 101,” and on the data integration issue, as part of the Artificial Intelligence and Data Initiative (AIDA). The military services are investing more in AI and related technologies such as autonomous systems. This, ironically, makes an independent JAIC less necessary. Renewing America Ideas and initiatives for renewing America’s economic strength. Email Address View all newsletters > Second, the JAIC has also faced challenges that the CDAO approach can address. The JAIC had multiple missions, including advising DoD on AI adoption, funding AI research, and building AI tools itself. The JAIC also lacked the authority to advance military service adoption of AI on its own, or to itself transform the connection between AI and overall DoD policy and strategy. The JAIC ended up arguably not policy-focused enough to lead on policy, and not technically equipped enough to lead on algorithm development. While the JAIC encouraged AI investment within DoD, its existence also highlighted how the uncoordinated DoD AI portfolio required even more organization. The CDAO approach will address some of these issues by fusing DoD data and AI efforts, as will a growing focus on AI in other DoD components, from Research & Engineering on the technology development side to OSD-Policy (Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy) on the strategy and governance side. Third, it is difficult to get things immediately right when it comes to converting emerging technologies into adopted innovations, especially for conservative institutions like militaries. We think about experimentation as a critical part of how the technology invention process works, but the same is true when it comes to transforming organizations. Given the way data access and integration are essential to innovation, consolidating data and AI, rather than having a specific JAIC only focused on AI, will make technological adoption across DoD more likely. While it will hopefully spur AI forward within the department, subsuming the JAIC into the CDAO does come with some risks. Currently, there is a widespread understanding that AI is essential for U.S. success in strategic competition and defense leadership. However, we may be taking the prioritization of AI for granted, and future DoD leaders might have a different perspective even if the capabilities of AI tools continue to mature and advance. If that were to happen, the absence of an independent JAIC could lead to a withering of focus on AI, and a downplaying of its importance and relevance, just at the key moment advances in algorithms become more relevant for many military functions. Reward requires risk, especially when it comes to innovation with emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. Technology development is not a linear process and often involves failure along the way. Innovation becomes even more challenging when it requires organizational change to facilitate adoption. Saying goodbye to the JAIC will be bittersweet—the JAIC played a critical role in advancing the U.S. military’s emphasis on AI and set the table for what is next. Moving forward, however, bringing the JAIC into the CDAO will create a more integrated approach to AI and data that is likely to help the United States achieve defense AI leadership.

#### Counterplan can’t solve hybrid warfare - DoD key to harden capabilities and deter cyber attacks

Anderson et al. 16 (R. Reed Anderson, Patrick J. Ellis, Antonio M. Paz, Kyle A. Reed, Lendy “Alamo” Renegar and John T. Vaughan *“STRATEGIC LANDPOWER AND A RESURGENT RUSSIA: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO DETERRENCE*: Chapter 4 THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, May 1, 2016, pp. 117-142, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12082.11>, WC)

Another challenge will be getting the right interagency trainers in the right country at the right time. With no overall decision-maker across the interagency other than the President, organizations will have to choose to contribute to the effort versus being compelled to contribute. In a resource-constrained environment, the ability of agencies to surge people forward will remain difficult. A potential DoD contribution in this area would be to leverage the unique capabilities and relationships that exist in the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). Although it would not be a systemic fix, the National Guard frequently has citizen soldiers who have unique skills from their civilian life that would transfer over to assisting with FID efforts. Stereotypically, there are a high number of police officers in the Guard who would have the ability to train in civil disturbance response. Information technology professionals would also be invaluable assets in assisting the Allies with hardening their networks against Russian cyberattacks. Additional funding and authorities would be required to effectively pursue this course of action but, in the short term, the National Guard could assist with filling this gap. The relationships already built through years of the SPP would serve to enhance this type of training.

The United States must also take into account the nature of the threat and the operational environment facing each ally when it considers training and equipping efforts. Each ally will use their forces in a manner informed by culture, history, geopolitics, and other factors, which ideally should shape the scope and breadth of U.S. efforts. For example, FID activities could enable the Baltic States in their efforts to counter ambiguous threats ultimately emanating from Moscow, but U.S. planners must be cognizant of Baltic State sensitivities toward their Russian-speaking populations. A large amount of the recommended FID training is already taking place under EUCOM’s TSC efforts. What is currently lacking is a synchronized interagency effort that is focused on building national resiliency as a component of an overall country specific strategy.

### 2AC – DoD key – Funding

#### DoD is better – they have the budget flexibility key to solve

Epstein and Rosen 18 (Susan B. Epstein, Specialist in Foreign Policy. Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics,“U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends” Congressional Research Service,” Congressional Research Service, Feb. 1, 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov R45091, WC)

Moreover, funding data for security assistance and data on historical security assistance funding are incomplete. Although DOS has long been required to track most security assistance funding by aid account and on an individual country basis, DOD has not. As a result, comparisons between security assistance funding provided by both departments are challenging, and totaling the two may leave gaps.

The 115th Congress is continuing scrutiny and debate on security assistance matters. Within the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs FY2018 budget request, the Administration is seeking to reduce international security assistance by about $2.3 billion, or 24.4%. Each of the security assistance programs would be reduced by amounts ranging from 9% to more than 54%. In addition, the Administration proposes making changes to security assistance programs, such as designating 95% of the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program to four countries. The remaining 5% of the funds, rather than being made available on a grant basis globally as FMF is currently implemented, would be made available to all other countries with a combination of grant and loan assistance to be coordinated with DOD. Congress is also debating a possible increase of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds for defense and nondefense, including for funding security assistance activities in FY2018.5

Currently, there is no DOD budget request for security cooperation programs and activities that is comparable to the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs FY2018 budget request for State Department-managed security assistance accounts. Soon, however, this may change; Section 1249 of the FY2017 NDAA added a new section to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, requiring the President, beginning with the FY2019 budget, to submit a formal, consolidated budget request for all DOD’s security cooperation efforts, including the military departments and, as practicable, by country or region and by authority.

### 2AC – CP fails – Staffing

#### DoS is structurally flawed and can’t solve – lack of talent and funding

Zeya and Finer 20 (Uzra S. Zeya, CEO and president of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, a network of more than 130 organizations working in over 180 countries to end conflict through peaceful means. Jon Finer, adjunct senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” Council on Foreign Relations, No. 89, November 2020, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/csr89_final.pdf>, WC)

It has become an article of faith among policymakers that principled American leadership has waned but remains in demand around the world. Moreover, America’s network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy—the Department of State (DOS)— has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis. However, there is a third framing assumption: that the current crisis offers an opportunity to address this predicament and revitalize American diplomacy. Despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms—and even in the face of sustained hostility from the current administration—diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests.

The role of the State Department has received heightened attention amid the onslaught it has suffered under the Donald J. Trump administration, which has treated American diplomats and diplomacy with a mix of neglect and disdain. But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades. Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations. Too often, leaders from both major parties have taken public support for U.S. leadership in the world for granted without making a strong enough case to the American public for why it is essential. Concrete steps can, and should, be taken solely through executive action in the first year of an administration committed to revitalizing American diplomacy, with thought to cementing change through legislation.

The most pressing challenges facing the State Department include a twenty-first-century policy environment that has, in some priority areas, evolved beyond the core competencies of most Foreign and Civil Service officers and an institution hollowed out by three years of talent flight, mired in excessively layered structure, and resistant to reform. Perhaps most important, they include the multigenerational challenge of a diplomatic workforce that falls woefully short of reflecting the diverse country it serves, particularly at the senior-most ranks, compromising its effectiveness and fostering a homogeneous and risk-averse culture that drives out rather than cultivates fresh perspectives. The State Department today risks losing the “war for talent,” not only to the private sector but increasingly to other government agencies, due to inflexible career tracks, self-defeating hiring constraints, and a lack of commitment to training and professional development. Finally, DOS is hampered by Congress’s failure over many years to pass authorizing legislation, leading to budgetary pressures and diminishing DOS’s status in the hierarchy of national security agencies rather than reinforcing the nation’s paramount foreign policy institution.

In an era in which the United States’ military and economic advantages over its nearest rivals are eroding and the more than $5 trillion spent in the U.S. war on terrorism since 9/11 has corresponded with a fivefold increase in global terrorist attacks annually, alliances and relationships with partners around the world are ever-important components of U.S. national power.1 In recent years, for a range of reasons, the United States’ international relationships have atrophied along with its diplomatic capacity to leverage them against the threats and opportunities it faces. The profoundly challenging moment at home— interrelated crises of public health, economic prosperity, and racial justice—is all the more reason to take stock of how to participate in the wider world, not turn away from it.

#### The DoS is ill-staffed to undergo a major AI crusade now

#### Buble 20 Courtney Buble, staff correspondent who covers federal management, oversight, contracting and regulations, “Watchdog Finds Serious Staffing and Leadership Problems at State Department”, JANUARY 23, 2020, https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2020/01/watchdog-finds-serious-staffing-and-leadership-problems-state-department/162621/

The State Department’s mission is compromised by “staff shortages, frequent turnover, poor leadership, and inexperienced and undertrained staff,” the department’s inspector general warned in a new report. “Workforce management issues are pervasive, affecting programs and operations domestically and overseas and across functional areas and geographic regions,” the watchdog [reported](https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/fy_2019_ig_statement_on_department_management_challenges.pdf) Wednesday. The [16-month hiring freeze](https://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2018/05/after-16-months-state-department-ends-hiring-freeze/148219/) imposed by the Trump administration in early 2017 continues to affect operations and morale, the IG found, noting that department officials anticipate it will take until 2021 to fully recover from its impact. All 38 bureaus and offices that responded to the IG’s survey and 97% of the embassies and consulates reported that the hiring freeze had either a somewhat negative or very negative effect on employee morale and welfare. “Employees told OIG that the hiring freeze contributed to excessive workloads, and the lack of transparency about the objectives intended to be achieved by the hiring freeze caused some to be concerned about losing their jobs,” the IG reported. Not all workforce problems can be attributed to the hiring freeze, however. The report cited challenges at the U.S. embassy in Nassau, Bahamas, stemming from senior leadership vacancies that date back years—the embassy has been without a permanent confirmed ambassador since November 2011. At the same embassy, the acting director of the Office of Foreign Mission was “overburdened and overwhelmed” from holding three positions and there was a disproportionate workload from the realignment of other personnel. In addition to staffing shortages, “under-qualified staff is an issue that frequently intersects with the department’s difficulties managing and overseeing contracts,” the IG said. For example, in Iraq, there was a lack of qualified employees to serve as contracting officer representatives and, in India, officers in charge of human rights and counterterrorism did not have the necessary training. In its response to the IG’s findings, State agreed that it is “critically important” to maintain adequate staffing levels and said the department has made significant progress: “Under Secretary Pompeo’s leadership, currently the department is just 1% shy of its goal to have over 13,000 Foreign Service employees by January 2020, with nearly 12,800 FS staff on board as of October 2019.” The department also aims to increase civil service hiring by about 7%, and is taking steps to improve retention and recruitment. Beyond staffing and training, the IG also cited a number of examples of poor leadership. At the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, which has 11 offices that carry out U.S. policy in the United Nations and other international organizations, the IG found allegations of political appointees disrespecting, retaliating against, and harassing career staff. Compounding the problems, leadership failed to address the issues. At the Libreville Embassy in Gabon, Africa, the problems were rife: a senior leader’s verbal outbursts rattled staff; supervisors failed to address poor performance; and the deputy chief of mission urged staff to find a job for his spouse, which possibly violated the anti-nepotism policy. “The department acknowledges that combatting a toxic workplace starts at the top; holding leadership accountable is key to maintaining a productive and mission-focused workplace,” State said in its response.

#### DoS lacks necessary personnel to engage in extensive foreign policy

Morello 17 Carol Morello, National reporter focusing on foreign policy and State Department, “State Department’s plan for staff cuts causing new worry in Congress”, November 15, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/state-departments-plan-for-staff-cuts-causing-new-worry-in-congress/2017/11/15/72576ac6-ca10-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d\_story.html

A growing, bipartisan number of lawmakers are expressing alarm over anticipated personnel cuts at the State Department, saying they have contributed to plummeting morale and will undermine diplomacy and foreign policy for years to come. In the latest example, Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) urged Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on Wednesday to lift a hiring freeze and promote experienced Foreign Service officers, requesting in a letter more details about Tillerson’s reorganization plan. Citing reports of declining morale, recruitment and retention levels, the senators wrote that "America's diplomatic power is being weakened internally as complex, global crises are growing externally." Tillerson's management decisions, they say, "threaten to undermine the long-term health and effectiveness of American diplomacy." The letter reflects mounting concern on Capitol Hill and among foreign policy experts about the loss of experienced diplomats under the Trump administration. On Tuesday, the Republican and Democratic heads of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said the State Department’s cuts are endangering the nation. Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.) called the cuts a risk to national security and a “high-level decapitation of leadership.” “Folks, this situation is alarming,” Cardin said. “We put our country in danger.” [[Senators sharply question State Department budget cuts](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tillerson-argues-state-departments-main-focus-should-be-on-us-security/2017/06/13/0438ebdc-503f-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html?utm_term=.43304fe2af4b)] The Office of Management and Budget has directed the State Department to slash its almost 76,000 employees by 8 percent. To meet that goal beyond normal attrition, the State Department is offering buyouts and early retirement incentives of $25,000 — before taxes — to the first 641 eligible people who sign up by April 30. The buyouts are being directed by the White House, not the seventh floor of the Harry S. Truman Building where Tillerson sits. Tillerson, who has proposed cutting almost 30 percent of his budget, has described his "redesign" of the State Department as his most important task. He has disputed accounts of low morale in Foggy Bottom, telling Bloomberg News recently, ["I'm not seeing it, I'm not getting it."](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-26/how-rex-tillerson-is-remaking-the-state-department) But anecdotes abound in the agency’s halls. Former ambassadors recalled to Washington feel humiliated about being assigned menial jobs such as reviewing Freedom of Information Act requests to clear a large backlog. Competition for overseas jobs has become fiercer as more young diplomats seek to escape the turmoil for the next few years. Many employees are still bristling over Trump’s assertion this month that while a number of key positions at the State Department still have no nominees to fill them, “I’m the only one that matters” in formulating foreign policy. Job opportunities also are shrinking at the U.S. Agency for International Development, which recently notified 97 applicants for overseas postings that the positions had been canceled, a tacit admission that the hiring freeze will be in place for a long time. [[USAID cancels jobs for dozens of applicants amid State Department hiring freeze](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/usaid-cancels-jobs-for-dozens-of-applicants-amid-state-department-hiring-freeze/2017/11/04/31c094c0-c0b9-11e7-959c-fe2b598d8c00_story.html?utm_term=.fe262a420522)] Nevertheless, State Department figures show that the number of employees remains about the same as it was when Tillerson took the reins in early February. Two-thirds of the 76,000 employees are locally employed in 276 missions around the world, leaving almost 14,000 Foreign Service officers and almost 11,000 civil service employees. Although the hiring freeze is still in effect, Tillerson has mitigated the impact by approving more than 2,300 exemptions to the freeze as of late October. Among the hires are about 300 new Foreign Service officers and almost 150 civil service employees. The numbers underscore a flight of experienced leadership. Barbara Stephenson, who heads the American Foreign Service Association union, wrote in a recent newsletter that senior leaders are departing at a “dizzying speed.” Among the figures she cited, three of the five career ambassadors, the highest rank for diplomats, have quit or retired since Tillerson took over. The number of career ministers, the next level down, also has decreased, from 33 to 19. The next-level ministers are down by 62 diplomats, to 369, just since Labor Day, “and are still falling,” she wrote. Stephenson also said that fewer Foreign Service officers are being recruited, and far fewer are taking the entrance exam, although State Department officials attribute this to an improving economy rather than a lack of interest. Stephenson thinks the damage will be felt for years. “The talent being shown the door now is not only our top talent but also talent that cannot be replicated overnight,” she wrote. This is not the first time the State Department has been hit with big staff cuts. Under President Bill Clinton, the department cut more than 2,000 employees, largely by shuttering the U.S. Information Agency, and closed consulates in 26 foreign cities. USAID, which runs foreign aid programs, closed 23 overseas missions. According to congressional aides who deal with State Department operations, the goal is again to reduce the ranks by 2,000 people, a proposed cut that has held steady since Trump came to office and before Tillerson took over. But the latest round of staff cuts is far less transparent than previous efforts, with almost no details provided to Congress, they say. “It’s being done behind the scenes,” said one aide, speaking on the condition of anonymity to offer frank insight about what they are hearing from State Department employees who don’t normally speak to Congress. “They dismiss the legitimacy of Foreign Service officers. They started working at breaking down morale from the get-go. There’s not a lot of trust there.” In their letter to Tillerson, Shaheen and McCain cited the union’s statistics to paint a picture of a State Department floundering. Shaheen sits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and McCain heads the Senate Armed Services Committee. “Taken together,” they wrote, “questionable management practices at the Department of State; the attitudes of some in the Administration on the value of diplomacy; declining morale, recruitment and retention; the lack of experienced leadership to further the strength and longevity of our nation’s diplomatic corps; and reports of American diplomacy becoming less effective paint a disturbing picture.”

### 1AR – DoD key

#### CP takes too long and requires operation shifts

Bergmann and Schmitt 21 (Max Bergmann, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, focusing on European security and US-Russia relations. Alexandra Schmitt, Senior Policy Analyst, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” American Progress, MAR 9, 2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)

Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency.

#### DoD solves better – their author concedes status quo security assistance fails through the DoS

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Congressional barriers exacerbated the DOD-State Department imbalance. The 2011 Budget Control Act and a Republican-controlled Congress skeptical of the State Department made giving more resources to the department a nonstarter.39 Senior DOD officials urged Congress to grant the agency new authorities, such as in a 2008 House Armed Services Committee hearing with the secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.40 Faced with these constraints, the Obama administration opted to create more authorities at the DOD through the annual must-pass National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees, with jurisdiction only over the State Department’s security assistance programs, did little to correct the imbalance.41 According to one study before the recent consolidation efforts, the DOD managed 48 out of 50 new programs created after the 9/11 attacks.42 Of the 107 existing security assistance programs today, the DOD manages 87—a whopping 81 percent.43

DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46